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Abstract 
This paper is a qualitative scrutiny of two crisis evaluations conducted by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS). The purpose is to investigate rhetoric used to analyse and assess the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa from a crisis 
management and disaster preparedness perspective. A modified grounded theory method is 
utilised. The qualitative method rests upon Quarantelli’s and ‘t Hart’s theories regarding 
differentiation of core principles and crisis-related political symbolism. 
The Horn of Africa and Haiti experienced humanitarian episodes of immense 
scope. Efforts to alleviate suffering, build resilience for future disasters, and ultimately save 
lives during crises are divided into two key tools: crisis management and disaster 
preparedness. CRS, the research extension of the US Congress, has failed to conduct 
constructive and accurate crisis assessments due to inconsistent rhetoric and sporadic failure 
to recognise crisis management and disaster preparedness as unique but indivisible tools. 
Independent crisis management/disaster preparedness literature authenticates and accentuates 
appropriate and/or lacking crisis rhetoric. The consequent development of a potential political 
landscape within the realm of crisis management concludes the paper. 
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Part 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Post-quake Haiti and the aftermath of the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa provided the 
international community with two crises of immense scope. The prior disaster was immediate, 
unexpected and acute while the latter came as a result of poor rains and crop failure combined 
with mass displacement and political insecurity. Nonetheless, Haitians and peoples of East 
Africa required a substantial injection of organised humanitarian assistance. Media attention 
was thwarted to the two regions, governments and renowned NGO’s operated to alleviate the 
respective humanitarian disasters and the international community mobilised funding for aid. 
An aspect often overshadowed by practical management issues is the necessary step of 
evaluating crises for allocating financial support, logistical support and other humanitarian 
necessities; no state or organisational entity commits to humanitarian efforts without rational 
basis. This process is entitled crisis evaluation or assessment. 
The Congressional Research Service, the public policy research extension for 
the United States Congress, constructed reports assessing the two crises in Haiti and the Horn 
region. “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response” was published merely three days after the 
disaster hit. “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response” 
was issued six months after the crisis reached disaster declaratory status. The Haiti report 
focuses on the immediate crisis as a result of the natural disaster and the international 
response to date while the Horn report supposedly provides a framework for international and 
humanitarian response, and an analysis of operational challenges. The purpose of the reports 
is to provide US Congress with legal and policy recommendations by assessing the crises, 
which subsequently reflect decisions regarding allocation of funding, logistical support and 
ultimately US humanitarian assistance. 
 Analysis and subsequent rhetoric portrayed in CRS’s reports thus has 
considerable leverage in terms of releasing humanitarian assistance to crisis struck regions 
across the world. Difficulty arises however when evaluation of crises are lacking rudimentary 
recognition of core principles of crisis management and disaster preparedness. From this 
perspective, it is possible to highlight reluctance or keenness an entity has of appropriately 
evaluating a crisis. CRS has conducted crisis assessments for many years, and two of this 
century’s worst humanitarian disasters are no exceptions. It begs the question of whether CRS 
6 
 
complies with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles when assessing Haiti 
and the Horn of Africa. 
  
1.2 Paper Objectives & Question Formulation 
The objective is to scrutinise CRS’s evaluation of two recent crises, one being a slow onset 
humanitarian crisis and the other a natural disaster. This essay will investigate rhetoric used to 
present, analyse and assess the crises focusing on crisis management/disaster preparedness 
discrepancies. It will subsequently argue that CRS has failed its purpose of presenting a 
framework for the international and humanitarian response, and analysing the operational 
challenges for crisis management and disaster preparedness in the Horn drought of 2011; it 
will also present CRS’s successes in doing so for the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Lastly, the 
essay will accentuate the successes and failures of CRS’s assessments by evaluating the 
aforementioned  reports in comparison to situation reports published by UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and conflict prevention literature written by 
the International Crisis Group (ICG). The two major research questions circulating this study 
are the following: 
Does CRS comply with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles? 
How do CRS’s crisis evaluation reports concur with (humanitarian) strategic and 
tactical managerial literature? 
In order to address these questions, the paper has been divided into different sections. Part 2 is 
limited to the first research question. Part 3 endeavours the latter whilst accentuating research 
findings from Part 2. The disposition of the paper is presented below. 
 
1.3 Theory 
Academic research on crisis management and disaster preparedness is vast and varied. While 
some scholars such as Brändström and Quarantelli focus on organisational and governmental 
decision-makers, others including ‘t Hart are more inclined towards power structures and 
symbolism crisis managerial actions entail. Researchers have in the past two decades 
conducted conceptual and empirical studies on the topic of large-scale crises, but scholars 
7 
 
agree that these studies lack psychological, socio-political and technological integration.1 The 
cross-disciplinary nature of organisational and governmental crises has particularly 
contributed to this lack of integration – Pearson and Clair elaborate upon this relationship, 
suggesting that the embracement of multidisciplinary approach has resulted to discussions 
regarding crisis management in “many different languages to different issues and audiences”.2 
Discrepancies are inevitable when researchers utilise stipulative definitions for crisis, 
management and preparedness whilst creating frameworks for successful crisis management. 
Consistency is much needed. 
In light of this, I found language and portrayed rhetoric the most important tool 
to clarify when discussing the Congressional Research Service’s reports. Consensus regarding 
imperative communication flow and organisational structures in crisis situations is 
widespread. However, I found that literature depicting successful or ineffective crisis 
management and disaster preparedness has a tendency of focusing on the exercise of authority 
and decision-making without reasonably acknowledging the dimension of symbolism and 
power. There is a need for a broader perspective on the nature of politics of crisis 
management. This is an intrinsically delicate relationship, where much needed rigorous 
definitions of crisis management and disaster preparedness, and the apparent necessity of a 
broader spectrum of crisis management discourse need to complement each other 
respectively. Therefore, I found the proposals put forward by Quarantelli and ‘t Hart useful as 
they combine and complement the much needed correlation between defining the phenomena 
and acknowledging wider social, economic and political factors. Enrico Quarantelli is a 
professor of sociology and founder of Disaster Research Centre at the University of Delaware. 
Paul ‘t Hart is a professor of public administration at the Utrecht School of Governance whose 
area of expertise include crisis management and policy evaluation. 
Quarantelli focuses on formal organisations as the social entity attempting to 
cope with crises. CRS, OCHA and ICG all acknowledge that the occurrences in Haiti and the 
Horn are in fact humanitarian crises. Quarantelli does not deal with crisis type situations like 
wars, terrorist attacks, civil disturbances etc; nor does he put non-community kinds of disaster 
crises such as transport accidents which do not affect the functioning of a community into 
                                                          
1
 Pearson, Christine M; Clair, Judith A, ”Reframing Crisis Management”, Academy of Management Review, 23.1 
(1998), p. 1. 
2
 Pearson, Christine M; Clair, Judith A, ”Reframing Crisis Management”, Academy of Management Review, 23.1 
(1998), p. 1; p. 3-5. 
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account in his definitions.3 The relevant premise is Quarantelli’s observation of partial 
correlation between the undertaking of preparedness planning and successful management of 
community disasters, i.e. the corresponding relationship between crisis management and 
disaster preparedness. He identifies two reasons for this: one is that planning is poor in the 
first place. This could depend on specific rather than generic planning, too segmented or 
segregated rather than involving all relevant social factors, or if planning demands artificial or 
far-from-everyday activities. Implementation will naturally be poor in actual disaster 
situations – poor planning can only encourage poor management activities.4 Given this, the 
other reason (which I find of great interest and relevance for the study) is the failure to 
recognise that the principles of crisis management differ from the principles of disaster 
preparedness. Quarantelli draws a parallel between crisis management/disaster preparedness 
and the military distinction between tactics and strategy: 
Strategy, in general, has reference to the overall approach to a problem or objective. But 
there are always situational factors or other contingencies which require particular 
adjustments to attain a specific goal if the overall objective is to be attained. This is the 
area of tactics. In somewhat parallel terms, good disaster preparedness planning involves 
the general strategies to be followed in readying for sudden community emergencies. In 
good crisis management, particular tactics are used to handle the specific situational 
contingencies which are present or which arise during the course of an emergency.5 
I found the clear distinction between the two unique but indivisible concepts to be pertinent 
for discussing the Congressional Research Service’s evaluation of the crises as focus is put on 
rhetoric discrepancies and inconsistency. 
Quarantelli’s summary of research findings provides an institutional perspective 
of great importance. Crises are interlinked however to social, economic and political 
conditions, and a full understanding of these factors is essential to understanding crisis 
management. Much of crisis management literature tends to be strongly oriented to 
managerial issues of planning, response and communication. This managerialist orientation 
has a tendency of being interpreted rather exclusively in functionalist-technocratic terms; 
                                                          
3
 Quarantelli, E.L. “Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings.” Trans. Array Crisis 
Management Volume II, Arjen Boin. 1st ed. London: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 45. 
4
 Quarantelli, E.L. “Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings.” Trans. Array Crisis 
Management Volume II, Arjen Boin. 1st ed. London: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 46. 
5
 Quarantelli, E.L. “Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings.” Trans. Array Crisis 
Management Volume II, Arjen Boin. 1st ed. London: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 46. 
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analysis angled for policy and organisational practice.6 Quarantelli focuses on this central 
dimension of crisis management and disaster preparedness. This element however does not 
itself contribute to a deeper understanding of crisis management rhetoric – socioeconomic and 
political factors are not put into account, and conflicts of interest are not sufficiently 
highlighted. The instrumental orientation dominating the field rests upon certain normative 
assumptions which ‘t Hart summarises in terms of a “functionalist paradigm emphasising 
control”.7 Decision makers themselves may be ambivalent in their interpretation of events, 
making the battle between different groups for dominant definitions of the situation all the 
more considerable. 
“Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management” 
introduces a more power-critical approach to the analysis of crisis management and draws 
attention to opportunity spaces crises entail for crisis actors. Paul ‘t Hart provides critical 
intersectional tools for comprehending the important role of political interests and the 
symbolic power of labelling; by whom, how and why an event is perceived as a crisis is a key 
empirical issue for crisis analysts.8 Although there is widespread consensus over the fact that 
the events presented below are in fact crises, rhetoric used to analyse the disasters differ 
respectively. In this context, I found the arguments of ‘t Hart useful. He identifies language as 
the most important instrument of crisis management and those who are able to define the 
crisis are most likely hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for resolution.9 The 
earthquake in Haiti is considered a crisis due to its immediate nature and colossal scope, but 
language used to depict the drought crisis suggests customariness, despite the millions 
affected. This power-critical approach is crucial for scrutinising the language used in reports 
published by the Congressional Research Service. 
 Quarantelli and ‘t Hart thus provide a functionalistic orientation perspective for 
policy and organisational practise with a power-critical approach focusing on language. The 
Congressional Research Service itself is not a legislative body, but its recommendations are 
                                                          
6
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 37. 
7
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 37. 
8
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 46. 
9
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 41. 
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key instruments for legislative and, to some extent, executive bodies in the US. The need to 
scrutinise evocative language used in CRS’s reports will thus be highlighted using 
multidisciplinary crisis management literature. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
A considerable fraction of literature on crises and emergencies stands out with its strong 
orientation to managerial issues of organisation, planning and response. Given the fact that I 
intended to investigate CRS’s compliance with crisis management and disaster preparedness 
principles, the appropriate methodological base of this study was a qualitative approach. This 
was crucial in uncovering meanings and contents of crisis assessments, rather than 
accumulating data concerning management chronology during and after the respective crisis. 
A stipulative version of grounded theory method (GT) was thusly selected in order to generate 
a hypothesis regarding crisis management/disaster preparedness acquiescence. Traditional GT 
is a research method which operates in a reverse fashion: rather than beginning with a 
hypothesis, the first step of GT is data collection. Subsequent collection of codes, concepts 
and finally categories are extracted, which form the basis for the construction of a theory.10 
I chose ten crisis assessments discussing Haiti and the Horn published by CRS. 
Subsequently, I identified anchors including but not limited to crisis, preparedness, 
management and political instability. This allowed the key points of the data to be gathered 
i.e. crisis management and disaster preparedness principles as defined by Quarantelli. Ten 
CRS reports discussing Haiti and the Horn were ventilated, exhausted and later limited to two 
primary sources, an issue which is elaborated upon below. Data collected from these two 
sources were grouped into collections of codes of similar content.11 It is at this particular point 
in which the method deviates from classic GT. I found the theories of ‘t Hart and Quarantelli 
to be extremely fitting in the collection of codes with similar content. Therefore, their theories 
were used to generate and simultaneously confirm clear categorisation between the two 
reports in an abductive manner, highlighting the practical dichotomy with theoretical 
                                                          
10
 Alvesson, Mats; Sköldberg, Kaj, Tolkning och reflection: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod, Denmark, 
Narayana Press, 2008, p. 141-150. 
11
 Alvesson, Mats; Sköldberg, Kaj, Tolkning och reflection: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod, Denmark, 
Narayana Press, 2008, p. 157-159. 
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support.12 Literature from ICG and OCHA acted as contextually verifying components for the 
analysed and synthesised data gathered from CRS’s crisis assessments. 
Crisis management and disaster preparedness are central terms in this study. 
There are a variety of definitions and I chose to provide definitions for the idioms in Part 2. 
Although it is a subject worth critical analysis, this study did not discuss the problematic (and 
somewhat contradictory) nature of crisis management/disaster preparedness principles. 
Difficulties and problematic factors with modified GT are based on the 
method’s prerequisite of objectivity. It is impossible to claim that I had no presumption when 
I undertook the study. As Thomas and James suggest, it is impossible to liberate oneself of 
preconditions in the collection and analysis of data in the way that GT advocates say is 
necessary.13 CRS’s compliance with crisis principles was (and is still) not an absolute 
phenomenon, but information accumulated from popular media and literature regarding US 
Foreign Policy has given one a resilient picture of the organisation’s expected rhetoric. 
Ultimately, I attempted to relinquish conjectures by presenting the crises as described by 
CRS. This itself is not without flaw – hence the contextual and comparing importance of ICG 
and OCHA literature. 
I chose my primary sources as a result of identified anchors and collection of 
key points (as described above). CRS’s report on Haiti was published just days after the 
earthquake while the Horn report was published in January 2012, six months after a disaster 
declaration was issued. The former crisis was one of immediate proportion while the latter 
came as a result of deteriorating climate conditions compounded by other factors. Therefore, I 
compiled the immediate disaster with a reactionary report and the slow onset crisis with a 
report ordained for short-term and long-term framework purposes. Nevertheless CRS 
literature used, regardless of type, was complemented with OCHA’s reactionary crisis 
management literature and ICG’s disaster preparedness (and to some extent crisis 
management) analysis. 
 
                                                          
12
 Douven, Igor (2011). Abduction, Stanford: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
available on http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/ (2013-01-02). 
13
 James, D; Thomas, G, (2006) “Reinventing Grounded Theory: Some Questions about Theory, Ground and 
Discovery”, British Educational Research Journal, 32.6 (2006), p. 767–795. 
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1.5 Disposition 
Part 2 is divided into four subchapters. Definitions and Background provide readers with 
definitions of crisis management and disaster preparedness. Also, the Congressional Research 
Service is briefly presented along with a historical contextualisation of the two regions of 
interest. The second subchapter discusses the Haitian crisis by presenting CRS’s crisis 
overview and outlook, with a subsequent independent analysis of crisis management and 
disaster preparedness rhetoric. The author attempts to emphasise the correlation between 
crisis definition and subsequent management rhetoric. The third subchapter has an identical 
disposition, but discusses the Horn. The last subchapter intertwines the analysis from the two 
prior subchapters of crisis management and disaster rhetoric in order to highlight the stark 
differences between the portrayed rhetoric. Part 2 attempts to frame CRS’s compliance with 
crisis management and disaster preparedness principles. 
 Part 3 introduces ICG and OCHA and contextualises their relevance in this 
paper. Haiti is presented first; relevant OCHA Situation Reports and ICG’s Latin 
America/Caribbean Report are compared and contrasted to CRS’s crisis evaluation report. 
The Horn is examined in an identical manner, utilising OCHA Situation Reports and a policy 
briefing published by ICG. The author attempts to highlight crisis management/disaster 
preparedness successes and failures. Part 3 analyses CRS’s concurrence with strategic and 
tactical managerial literature. Part 4 concludes the findings and provides a short reflection on 
the correspondence between crisis assessment and development of political landscapes. 
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Part 2 
2.1 Definitions and Background 
2.1.1 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness 
Crisis management is an inherently complex and politically controversial phenomenon. It can 
only be defined and analysed to the fullest extent if managerial, functionalist decision making 
is complemented by a power-critical perspective. Paul ‘t Hart elaborates on this relationship. 
He suggests that a useful set of tools lending themselves to a power-critical analysis of the 
dynamics of crises and of prevalent crisis management practices can be found in theory and 
research on the symbolic dimensions of politics and administration.14 In other words, 
symbolism within the realm of crisis management complements political agendas and 
administrative willingness upon the face of crises, making rhetoric a key instrument to fully 
grasp prevalent crisis management. 
 As this study will focus on CRS’s reports on two humanitarian emergencies, 
crisis management in this context is defined as the process by which an organisation or 
political entity understands and handles major events. Crisis management is characterised by 
tactical measures used to comprehend and act upon urgent threats to the well-being of people, 
and the dearth of time to act on the situation.15 Disaster preparedness on the other hand is 
strategic management processes employed by organisations or governments to protect and 
prepare the people from future disasters, and ensure the resilience of the organisational or 
political structure.16 This study will focus on the rhetoric the two reports convey. Crises are 
linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions - as many scholars of crisis 
phenomena have emphasised, a “full understanding of these factors is essential to 
understanding crisis management”.17 However, a clear distinction between the two concepts is 
vital in order to avoid definition discrepancies and to righteously scrutinise the Congressional 
Research Service. 
                                                          
14
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 37. 
15
 Quarantelli, E.L. “Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings.” Trans. Array Crisis 
Management Volume II, Arjen Boin. 1st ed. London: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 46. 
16
 Quarantelli, E.L. “Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings.” Trans. Array Crisis 
Management Volume II, Arjen Boin. 1st ed. London: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 46. 
17
 ‘t Hart, Paul, “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1.1 (1993), p. 39. 
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2.1.2 Congressional Research Service 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a public policy research extension of the US 
Congress. Almost a century old, CRS provides policy and legal analysis to committees and 
members of the House of Representatives and Senate, regardless of political affiliation. CRS 
experts support Congress at every stage of legislative processes – from early considerations 
and proposals to oversight of enacted laws and agency activities. CRS does not however make 
legislative or other policy recommendations to Congress. Nevertheless, its recommendations 
regarding public policy are vital because Congress, the bicameral legislature of the federal 
government of the US, relies on CRS to “marshal interdisciplinary resources, encourage 
critical thinking and create innovative frameworks to help legislators form sound policies and 
reach decisions on a host of difficult issues”.18Hence, it is an influential and important 
organisational entity in Congress. 
 
2.1.3 Background: The Horn of Africa & Haiti 
The Horn of Africa is a peninsula located in the easternmost protrusion of the African 
continent. It is inhabited by roughly 100 million, most of which live in Ethiopia. The Horn of 
Africa denotes the region including the countries Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. 
However, given the reach of the drought crisis, Kenya has been included and considered part 
of the Horn of Africa region for the purposes of the forthcoming review. 
 Drought is a predictable event in the region’s arid climate. Major famines have 
taken place, ranging from the famine in Tigray (1958) to the Somali famine caused by 
drought and civil war in the early 1990’s. 8 major famines have taken place in some or all 
regions of the Horn since 1984.19 As expressed by the UN News Centre, “a famine can be 
declared only when certain measures of mortality, malnutrition and hunger are met. They are: 
                                                          
18
 Congressional Research Service (2012). About CRS, Washington: Library of Congress, available on 
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/ (2012-11-27). 
19
 Miller, Jonathan (2010). Drought threatens African humanitarian crisis, London: Channel 4 News, available 
on 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/africa/drought+threatens+african+humanitarian+crisis/3697427.ht
ml (2012-10-09). 
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at least 20 per cent of households in an area face extreme food shortages with a limited ability 
to cope; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 per cent; and the death rate exceeds two persons 
per day per 10,000 persons”.20 Moreover, the Horn of Africa’s inhabitants are no strangers to 
political instability and armed conflicts, ranging from civil war in Somalia to prolonged 
hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. All countries in the region (with the exception of 
Somalia) have been categorised using Human Development Index (2011) by the UNDP as 
states with Low Human Development. Democracy Index (2010, 2011), compiled by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and endorsed by the Swedish International Development Agency, 
rank Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea in 103rd, 121st, 147th and 154th place respectively.21 
Somalia’s last inclusion in the HDI ranking was in the 1996 report. Political fundamentalism, 
lack of freedom of press and unemployment are terms used extensively to portray the political 
status quo of the African peninsula. 
 Haiti is a small Caribbean country which borders to the Dominican Republic. 
With a population of roughly 10 million (half of which are under the age of 20), the relatively 
homogenous populace is concentrated in Haitian towns and cities: Port au Prince, the capital, 
has 1.25 million inhabitants. 
 Political instability and severe weather predicaments also characterise Haiti’s 
contemporary history. The hereditary dictatorship of the Duvalier family lasted for almost 30 
years, only to be succeeded by a military regime in 1986. Democratic rule was dominant in 
the 1990’s but was nevertheless vacillating. A coup in 2004 led to great uncertainty between 
the Haitian government and the United States, their major international ally. Moreover, Haiti 
has a history of major flooding and tropical storms since the new millennia, creating social 
unrest due to soaring food and fuel prices in 2004 and 2008.22 Haiti is in 114th place in the 
Democracy Index (2011) and in ranked 145th in the Human Development Index (2010). Given 
the fact that in its 200 year history, Haiti has suffered 32 coups, the Caribbean state is also 
                                                          
20
 UN News Centre (2011). When a food security crisis becomes a famine, UN News Centre, available on 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39113#.UHVT8hVg-8A (2012-10-10). 
21
 Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under stress, Singapore: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, available on 
http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/S%C3%A5%20arbetar%20vi/EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf 
(2012-10-10). 
22
 Delva, Joseph Guyler; Loney, Jim (2008). Haiti’s government falls after food riots, Port-au-Prince: Reuters, 
available on http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/13/us-haiti-idUSN1228245020080413 (2012-10-10). 
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typified by political instability, albeit dissimilar, and of lesser severity and political 
complexity than that of its East African counterpart. 
 
2.2 Haiti 
2.2.1 Crisis Overview and Outlook 
On the 12th January 2010, the largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the 
country, including the capital. The epicentre, 25 kilometres (15 miles) southwest of Port-au-
Prince, had a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale, subsequently affecting a third of Haiti’s 
population. A disaster declaration was immediately issued. Search and rescue operations for 
survivors were made the country’s top priority, along with electricity generation capability 
and provision of mobile medical units. 
 It comes as no surprise that the Congressional Research Service was not able to 
outline detailed priorities of the Haitian and international humanitarian response. “Haiti 
Earthquake: Crisis and Response” was published three days after the deadliest natural disaster 
in the Western Hemisphere struck Haiti as a reactionary report focusing on the immediate 
crisis and the (then) response to date (15th January 2010). The contents clearly outline a linear 
disposition where status of the crisis is followed a “response” subheading or “relief operation 
outline”. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, key priorities were quickly identified. Imminent 
threat to Haitians lives due to collapsed infrastructure was of major concern. Loss of crucial 
personnel, including Haitian government officials and UN civilian staff and peacekeepers 
further complicated the mass adversity. No initial figures regarding casualties are given in the 
report, but it mentions that estimates may “reach into the hundreds of thousands”.23 The 
unyielding basis is that little is yet known: the severity of the earthquake and the fundamental 
need for a quick humanitarian relief operation can only be obtained after a full determined 
assessment of the disaster on the ground.24 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Taft-Morales, Maureen; Margesson, Rhoda. United States. Congressional Research Service. Haiti Earthquake: 
Crisis and Response, Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2010, summary. 
24
 Taft-Morales et al, p. 3. 
17 
 
2.2.2 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness: Haiti 
Congressional Research Service’s report on Haiti focuses “on the immediate crisis [...] as a 
result of the earthquake and the US and international response”.25 It comes as no surprise that 
casualty figures and other details are not presented (as stated above), but the report outlines 
the situation considerably well. Haitian government response is initially presented, stressing 
their top priorities. The World Bank and other actors “were working with the Haitian 
government to incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy 
and to develop its capacity for disaster response”.26 Although the focus of its risk management 
efforts targeted hurricanes (the most common cause of natural disasters on the island), there is 
a firm differentiation between incorporating risk management into the country’s development 
strategy and developing disaster response. The false perception that the presence of disaster 
preparedness planning will only require implementation of prior planning in the event of a 
crisis is discarded at an early stage; the immediate tactical means of crisis management are 
mapped as priorities while the strategic means of recovery and reconstruction, parallel to the 
relief efforts, would begin as soon as possible.27  
 Kenneth H. Merten, Ambassador to Haiti, issued a disaster declaration on the 
13th January.28 The US response is divided into humanitarian assistance and domestic 
legislation. The latter is embodied in temporary halting the deportation of Haitians, 
facilitating the evacuation of US citizens and issuing a travel warning.29 Humanitarian 
assistance from the US focuses on search and rescue, logistics and infrastructure support, 
provision of assistance where possible, and conducting needs assessments.30 USAID deployed 
a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Other smaller teams were sent to assist 
DART, including the Response Management Team and the Fairfax Urban Search and Rescue 
Team to assess humanitarian needs and to assist with coordination at the US Embassy. The 
US response is closely linked to the priority of search and rescue, but also crisis assessment.  
Relevant humanitarian relief sectors, called clusters, are usually established 
during humanitarian crises in order to coordinate partners, facilitate planning and prioritise 
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resources. Emergency shelter, food assistance, health, logistics and water/sanitation were 
organised by various agencies (including IOM and WFP). A variety of other NGO’s already 
operating in Haiti work in partnership with relevant organised clusters, but the head of each 
cluster reports to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, the senior-most UN official in a 
country experiencing a humanitarian emergency. The earthquake was a crisis which needed 
“immediate provision of emergency supplies and personnel”,31 and organisations such as the 
IFRC contributed with medical assistance and tracing missing people. 
Ultimately, crisis management in its tactical means are highlighted and depicted 
as the priority from a US foreign political perspective. There is no discrepancy regarding 
crisis management and disaster preparedness; instead the report clearly indicates the difficulty 
of fully determining the humanitarian needs before conducting in-depth assessments for a 
more detailed understanding of the circumstances on the ground.32 Prior efforts to 
strategically use the “window of opportunity to enable the consolidation of stability and the 
undertaking of a process of sustainable development” are by no means undermined by 
unimaginable conditions following the earthquake.33 As Quarantelli concludes, although such 
coordination remains relative at best and is seldom achieved, good prior disaster planning 
may reduce effectively the convergence of nullifying organisations and thus allow a relative 
degree of coordination.34 The later reality does not correspond with the idealistic premise (as 
discussed later), but it is vital to appreciate CRS’s rhetoric as it differentiates the two unique 
but indivisible managerial tools.  
 
2.3 The Horn of Africa 
2.3.1 Crisis Overview 
Mark Bowden, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, issued a famine 
declaration on the 20th July for two regions of southern Somalia. The UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) elevated the status of the Horn drought 
crisis to a major, large-scaled emergency on the same day. At that particular period, it was 
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believed that 750’000 people were in the brink of starvation. When the report was published 
(6th January 2012), an estimate of 13.3 million people were believed to be affected by the 
humanitarian crisis, 250’000 of whom needed food assistance “in the near term to avoid 
death”.35 
 Rains between October and December 2011 brought some relief to the arid 
drought-affected areas in the region. Although the shift in severity was most likely due to 
increased provision of assistance by the international community, the effectiveness impacted 
relief efforts negatively, causing logistical barriers for the delivery of assistance. Flooding and 
displacement affected an already vulnerable demographic group, initiating fears of higher 
rates of water-borne respiratory diseases and malaria. Furthermore, deterioration of security 
conditions due to increasing restriction on humanitarian access in Somalia by the insurgent 
fundamentalist group Al-Shabaab combined with security incidents within the Dadaab 
refugee camp complex in Kenya complicated the logistical and distributive means in which 
organisations operated within. To summarise, the arid plains of East Africa, devastated by a 
slow onset and critical drought, and subsequently a famine, has been subjected to what is 
suggested to be a humanitarian impasse by the Congressional Research Service. Massive 
displacement and political insurgency complicates what is described as “the worst 
humanitarian crisis in the world”.36  
While the United States remains the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian 
assistance to the Horn, the report clearly implies (prior to the framework for humanitarian 
response and its analysis of operational challenges) the near impossibility of managing the 
crisis by accentuating the development of the slow onset crisis proportions, and failing to 
recognise that the principles of disaster preparedness planning are different from those of 
crisis management.37 CRS’s outline of the humanitarian crisis and international response 
mentions that previous droughts have been responded to by “establishing early warning 
systems and ‘safety nets’ to mitigate the types of impact poor climate conditions are having 
on the region” and that without these mechanisms in place, “the current crisis would have 
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been worse.”38 However, as presented later and argued throughout the essay, the failure to 
appropriately distinguish the principles of crisis management and disaster preparedness as two 
separate entities in the Horn of Africa has led to ambivalent and sporadically inconsistent 
rhetoric in the report prepared for members and committees of the US Congress.  
 
2.3.2 Current Outlook 
The Congressional Research Service identifies three major issues of concern regarding the 
(then) current outlook on the humanitarian crisis: 1) soaring food prices and dearth of 
crops/loss of livelihoods; 2) security impasse created by insurgent political groups and strains 
within overpopulated refugee camps (most notably Dadaab in north-eastern Kenya, close to 
the Somali border); and 3) displacement and vulnerable populations. The third predicament is 
portrayed as a result of the former two as population movements often occur in crises 
resulting from natural disasters or conflict.39 Life-saving assistance is clearly the priority, as 
emphasised in the report. Soaring food prices due to crop failures and perished livestock 
resulted in raises of staple food prices, ranging from 51 % in Kenya to 240 % in Somalia 
between June 2010 and June 2011.40 FEWS NET analysed and concluded that while 
Ethiopia’s food needs would decline in 2012, food assistance need in Somalia would remain 
far above typical levels.41 
 Internally Displaced Person’s (IDP’s) and refugees fall under the category 
“vulnerable and displaced populations”.42Although the acuteness of their malnourishment is 
recognised (and indeed highlighted), preventing secondary causes of death and illness related 
to malnutrition “including communicable diseases such as measles, cholera, and respiratory 
infections, and vector-borne diseases such as malaria” is seen as critical.43 Poor sanitation 
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conditions, over-crowded living conditions and limited safe drinking waters have led to a rise 
of fatality rate among children. With the onset of the rainy season combined with the large 
influx of IDP’s and refugees, the risk of spread of measles and acute watery diarrhoea has 
dramatically increased.44 
 The number of displaced Somalis continues to change: Ethiopia witnessed a 
radical drop of refugee influx towards the end of 2011 while Kenya continues to receive over 
1’100 refugees per day.45 Along with the aforementioned health constraints, the lack of 
security poses an imminent threat to the well-being of refugees. A “suspension of all but 
emergency relief efforts at the Dadaab camps” was caused by rising insecurity and a series of 
kidnappings close to the Kenya-Somalia border.46 Relocation of some refugees living in over-
crowded areas of the camp was suspended because of rising insecurity. Al-Shabaab imposed 
restriction of access to the World Food Programme, which intensifies security concerns and 
increases the possibility of IDP’s and refugees, who have received humanitarian assistance in 
the past to return to famine.  
 
2.3.3 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness: the Horn 
The Congressional Research Service’s report “Horn of Africa Region: the Humanitarian 
Crisis and International Response” is supposed to provide an overview of the current status of 
the crisis, summary background on the region, a framework for the international and 
humanitarian response, and an analysis of some of the operational challenges in East Africa.47 
It presents as shown above a crisis overview and the current outlook of the humanitarian 
circumstances. As this section will argue, however, the omission of certain terminology in 
CRS’s report and the reluctance to separate crisis management and disaster preparedness 
when describing and analysing the framework for international and humanitarian response 
characterise the failure of drafting a suitable crisis evaluation. 
 The Congressional Research Service quickly identifies three major causes of 
concern. The food situation is perhaps the most tangible and acute of the three, with an 
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estimate of 13 million people in the Horn who are in need of food and other humanitarian 
assistance according to WFP. 9.6 million of the drought affected population are in need for 
near-term food assistance.48 A separate humanitarian cluster, or sector focusing on specific 
relief activities, lead food dispersion in Somalia and Ethiopia, embodied by WFP. They are 
feeding 7.4 million people in the Horn countries, with other agencies taking the responsibility 
for delivering food in areas of southern Somalia. 
As humanitarian assistance in Kenya is led by their government, WFP assist in 
developing programmes to “transition from short-term interventions to recovery activities 
such as food-for-assets [...] through which WFP, working with the Kenyan Government, is 
helping communities to improve their ability to manage and recover from drought through 
investments in community and agricultural infrastructure”.49 Kenya is thus assisted through 
strategic supplements in which recovering mechanisms are highlighted: WFP estimates that 
the programme will reach 500’000 people in 2012.50 Kenya’s central highlands are among 
Africa’s most productive agricultural areas, but the arid north is exposed to similar 
agricultural farming conditions as southern Somalia. The vital factor in Kenya’s recovery 
resides in the relatively ensured security and political stability. No other country’s future in 
the region is constructively presented and analysed in the terms of crisis management and 
disaster preparedness as Kenya; the appeal for humanitarian response, according to CRS, 
focuses on two parallel tracks – one to respond to acute humanitarian needs including the 
refugee crisis and urban challenges, and the other on rebuilding resilience to emergencies 
within communities.51 
 Challenges Somalia is facing regarding humanitarian assistance are almost 
exclusively connected to access and delivery due to security concerns. The United States 
considers Somalia too dangerous to maintain a diplomatic presence, and the TFG’s capacity 
to coordinate relief efforts is righteously undermined.52 Al Shabaab’s decision to drive many 
international aid groups out of southern Somalia due to their inconsideration for farmers and 
hidden agendas in 2009 sparked the complex nature of the insecurity and infrastructure 
predicament. Coordination and aid oversight is also a challenge; the absence of a functioning 
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central authority has made extortion and ad hoc taxation possible by militia groups and road 
checkpoints. Al Shabaab also announced that it has banned 16 UN agencies and other 
international NGO’s for advocating secularism and demonstrating a lack of neutrality.53 
However, with this in mind, WFP has scaled up assistance in Somalia via airdrops and new 
routes by land. Other relief organisations have been able to continue operations, including the 
ICRC and multiple Islamic organisations. 
 The US State Department has expressed that they would focus on the response 
to address short-term needs and save lives, but also “build capacity to reduce the cycles of 
famine and failure that occur repeatedly in the Horn region”.54 USAID estimates that nearly 
$220 million would go to humanitarian assistance in the Horn, of which $194 million will be 
for food aid in FY2012.55 The State Department emphasise the strengthened assistance and 
increased funding for early warning systems in its DART offices in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. 
Safety net programmes and developing agricultural sectors are also mapped as critical 
contributions by US humanitarian efforts. These measures are undoubtedly long-term 
strategic instruments for development and disaster preparedness. Albeit necessary, it is worth 
consideration and scrutiny that the efforts are only applicable to Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Djibouti: Somalia and Eritrea are not included.56 
 It is worth noting that CRS’s report on the Horn appreciates the inadequate 
resources provided for the humanitarian response. Funding in the near term has improved, but 
concerns remain about sustaining support throughout the crisis which is expected to last well 
into 2012.57 Although restrictions imposed by Al Shabaab pose a great obstacle, inadequate 
funding and donor government regulations restricting operation and access remains, according 
to CRS, the greatest impediment to humanitarian assistance in Somalia.58 
Rhetoric consistent in CRS’s depiction and analysis of humanitarian assistance 
in Somalia is the omission of crisis management in one hand and the emphasis on the 
“recovering factor” and the security “impasse”. As stated above, disaster preparedness 
policies drafted by the State Department are not applicable for Somalia. CRS’s report 
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concludes that no one can state with any certainty when the drought-driven factors of the 
crisis will end, and sustaining the humanitarian effort through to the end of the crisis remains 
a huge concern.59 It acknowledges that the drought has triggered the worst international 
humanitarian crisis in the world, but fails to respect an essential principle of a crisis: finite 
time for response.60 Assistance efforts in 2012, according to CRS’s report, “will focus on 
providing life-saving assistance [...] and prevent further displacement by assisting people 
where they live [...] [by] providing a minimum package of services and strengthening the 
protection of vulnerable populations”.61 The ambiguity of institutional actors and reluctance 
to provide geographic referees stands in direct contrast to the presentation of difficulties of 
providing assistance in Somalia. Here, the challenges are presented in practical detail, ranging 
from the restriction on US aid and UN sanctions to refugee influx to hosting neighbouring 
countries.62 With political will considered, it is still possible to recognise the omission of 
“crisis management” in the entire report, which is wretchedly extraordinary in a report 
examining the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Particular tactical rhetoric is not used to 
handle the specific situational contingencies which are present during the course of the 
emergency in Somalia. In other words, disaster preparedness in the form of relief projects 
overshadows and subsequently invalidates the need for crisis management in a country facing 
its worst drought in 60 years. 
 
2.4 Crisis Rhetoric in the Horn of Africa and Haiti 
The two crises are very different from one another in several dimensions. Political 
contextualisation of the crises gives one a firm understanding of taken precautions and 
resulting humanitarian assistance. It is neither shocking nor controversial that the US assisted 
Haiti in its immediate crisis to save as many lives as possible, but also to prohibit mass 
migration of Haitians towards North America. It comes as no surprise that the Congressional 
Research Service acknowledges the difficulty of providing aid services in Somalia, a country 
with weak central authority and an active fundamentalist insurgent terrorist group. The crises 
stand in stark contrast to one another, one being a massive earthquake shaking the foundation 
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of everyday life in a fragile democracy, the other a slow onset drought in a border-crossing 
region complicated by political insurgency and lacking infrastructure. 
 There is, however, a common misconception about crises. The epochs of 
profound uncertainty and urgent challenges may have their own distinct physical 
characteristics and level of escalation, but they are not unique. If one goes beyond the 
specifics of time, place, method and scale, or looks beyond physical events and examines 
challenges to communities and policy-makers, crises lose their unique essence.63 
Humanitarian relief efforts and other NGO activities operate in both cases, regardless of 
disaster. To a certain extent, the reports provided by the Congressional Research Service are 
extensions of US foreign policy and act as recommendations. Whether this justifies the 
omission of crisis management when describing and analysing the worst humanitarian crisis 
in the world for Congress is doubtful. CRS’s report on Haiti on the other hand, albeit urgently 
written, acknowledges the urgency of the earthquake and the importance of prior significant 
progress in the country’s development strategies.64 It begs the question of whether the 
immediate severity decides the subsequent quality of crisis management rhetoric in US 
foreign policy. 
 At a rhetorical level, evocative language is used to generate or reflect popular or 
elite anxieties; the very act of labelling a particular set of conditions a “crisis” is itself a 
rhetorical act.65 It is impossible to deny the extent of the two crises presented. However, the 
decision to omit crisis management in CRS’s report on the Horn conveys a certain assessment 
of the situation as opposed to CRS’ report on Haiti in terms of seriousness and the eventual 
allocation of responsibility for the crisis situation. The complex set of challenges in terms of 
poor infrastructure and insecurity are justifiably presented but excessively accentuated in 
episodes concerning access and aid delivery, IDP’s and vulnerable populations, and crisis 
overview in CRS’s report on the Horn. Such language acts as an important function to de-
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politicise the crisis event and employing a “non-partisan” channel for defining the situation 
and assessing success and failure.66  
CRS addresses Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti in little detail. Kenya’s challenges 
and appeals however are assessed as collective to the international community, most likely 
because they are aligned with US interests, ranging from concerns regarding security and 
demographic implications of refugees crossing to Kenya, to focus on providing life-saving 
assistance to IDP’s and refugees where they live.67 Kenya is an important regional ally to the 
United States, and with the presence of a relatively stable government compared to its 
neighbours, CRS presents the humanitarian appeal thoroughly, thereby employing a “non-
partisan” channel defining the situation and linking the crisis in Kenya to social, economic 
and political conditions determining the US ally’s success and failures. 
Diplomatic presence in Somalia is non-negotiable due to political and security 
reasons, and given the historical context where US military presence in the 1990’s caused 
mass unpopularity with the American people after 19 soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 
1993, it comes as no surprise that CRS refrains from labelling US efforts as crisis 
management. This strategy is quite effective as it realigns different and mutually contradictory 
definitions of the situation – it remains the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. 
Nevertheless, pessimists (in this case CRS) are less sanguine about policy-makers’ ability and 
their willingness to critically assess their past performances during intensely political 
episodes. They are motivated to exaggerate their success and thus “over learn” from them in 
the future. Hence, their failures are obfuscated and “explained away”, thereby “under-
learning” from them.68 
 Crisis language in CRS’s report on Haiti however is unequivocal, consistent and 
constructive. The thoroughgoing theme evident in CRS’s “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and 
Response” is the consistent differentiation: crisis management is exemplified in tactical means 
by outlined priorities drafted by the Haitian government, USAID and other international 
actors. Disaster preparedness planning on the other hand is embodied in structural 
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programmes present prior to the disaster, ranging from Haiti’s capacity for disaster response 
to poverty reduction strategy. The reference to overall approaches to certain objectives 
(poverty reduction, disaster response), though weak, is complemented by the severe 
situational factor which required particular adjustments and specific goals. They do not 
collide. This is the true essence of the indivisible but unique nature of crisis management and 
disaster preparedness. As ‘t Hart stresses, the structure of political institutions and the way 
they operate reflect elaborate set of interaction rules enabling, yet also selectively impairing, 
the articulation of demands, the settlement of conflict and the formulation and implementation 
of public policies.69 CRS manages to embody all these traits when formulating their pressing 
report on the immediate crisis in Haiti published just days after the earthquake. 
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Part 3 
3.1 OCHA and ICG 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (henceforth OCHA) is 
the Secretariat “responsible of bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent 
response to emergencies”.70 In December 1991, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 
46/182, designed to strengthen the United Nation's response to both complex emergencies and 
natural disasters.  It also aimed at improving the overall effectiveness of the UN's 
humanitarian operations in the field. The resolution created the high level position of 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, whose function would combine tasks carried out by 
representatives of the Secretary-General for major emergencies into a single UN focal point. 
As part of the Secretary-General’s programme reform in 1998, the Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was reorganised into OCHA, expanding its mandate to include 
the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. 
Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to 
the Red Cross Movement and NGO’s.71 
 The International Crisis Group (henceforth ICG) is an independent NGO 
working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve conflicts 
around the world. Their approach is grounded in field research; based on information and 
assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical 
recommendations to key decision makers.72 Founded in 1995, ICG’s five key roles in 
preventing and resolving conflict are: early warning coverage through its long-term presence, 
producing independent field-based analysis and advice, providing detailed actor mapping, 
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offering new strategic thinking on intractable conflicts and crises, and focusing international 
attention on “forgotten” peace-building processes.73 
 These two organisational sources will be used to fortify the above analysis of 
CRS’s crisis assessments. OCHA has an emergency related role customary to relief discourse, 
and ICG is regarded as an independent body working for conflict prevention and resolution. 
These perspectives, one being a short-term relief-based (crisis management) and the other 
short to long-term constructive conflict evasion (crisis management and disaster 
preparedness), will highlight CRS’s successes and failures in addressing post-disaster Haiti 
and constructively assessing the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. 
 
3.2 Haiti 
3.2.1 OCHA 
OCHA’s situation reports considered in the following comparison were published two and ten 
days after the earthquake hit. The disposition for these reports is as following: key priorities 
are presented, followed by a situation overview. Humanitarian needs and response is 
subsequently presented, with subcategories discussing logistics, food, health, WASH (water, 
sanitation and hygiene), shelter/Non-food Items (NFI’s), nutrition, protection and agriculture. 
Coordination, funding and contacts conclude the reports. The reports systematically identify 
strains related to post-quake Haiti and the consequentially required tactical measures. This 
part of the essay will present crisis management in post-quake Haiti using a source focusing 
on the assessment of immediately needed provisions. This narrative will highlight the (to 
some extent) corresponding rhetoric with CRS and confirm both sources correlation with ‘t 
Hart’s and Quarantelli’s theories regarding symbolism and clear distinction. 
 Situation Report #3 was published one day before CRS’s “Crisis and Response”. 
The loss of water supply, electricity and communications are regarded as problematic 
incentives for looting and other crimes. Major hospital collapses and prison escapees pose as 
obstacles for quick recovery and security. Top priority is given to search and rescue assistance 
parallel to the critical concern regarding food, clean water and sanitation. These issues are 
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quickly followed by the humanitarian response in constructive detail. For example, under 
WASH, a cargo worth $500’000 with oral rehydration salts, water purification tablets and 
tents for temporary housing for 10’000 arrived in Haiti on the day of publication, with another 
cargo due to arrive on the same day.74 
 By the time Situation Report #11 was published, the top priority of search and 
rescue was declared over by the Haitian government.75 As of the day of publication (22nd 
January 2010), the government accounted for 111’481 deaths and over 600’000 people 
without shelter in the capital. Situation Report #11 is less reactionary than its third counterpart 
(which stemmed from the immediate assessment need), and this is understood from the 
concerns discussed: focus is put on potential health issues and migration from Port-au-Prince 
to already vulnerable communities. For example, WHO notes no reported outbreaks of 
communicable disease including cholera, measles and rubella despite strained conditions. 
WHO recognises however the immediate need of Haiti’s immunisation programme, which 
was not functioning, creating the immediate concern of tetanus.76 WFP, who handled the food 
cluster, was only able to reach 27’000 people by 21st January due to warehouse constraints 
and prioritising hospitals and orphanages.77 
 Situation Report #3 is thus an evaluative record of implemented and necessary 
humanitarian interventions in post-disaster Haiti. Situation Report #11 on the other hand acts 
as a follow-up to prior post-quake humanitarian interventions, further elaborating on short-
term needs. Both reports aim to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian 
action in partnership with the Haitian government and international actors. These reports 
discuss humanitarian crisis management in its purest form: communication processes, 
information flow and the exercise of authority are concentrated in the cluster arrangement 
working with the Haitian government. For example, WFP heads food assistance, WHO leads 
the health cluster and UNICEF organises the WASH cluster, all whom which report to the 
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. The last vitality when crisis management is discussed 
(development of coordination and loosening command structure) is difficult to evaluate in 
situation reports as this issue’s success cannot be derived at such an early stage of the disaster 
(ICG criticises the humanitarian intervention in Haiti regarding this point, see below). 
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CRS employed a near identical rhetoric in “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and 
Response”. Each organisational entity managing a humanitarian cluster is presented and 
humanitarian needs and response in CRS’s report has an uncanny resemblance to the OCHA 
reports – logistics, food, health, water and sanitation, emergency shelter and infrastructure 
support are all focal points in CRS’s crisis management assessment.78 A natural consequence 
perhaps, but as ‘t Hart emphasises, the field of symbolic action evolves around central themes 
of political processes as constructed realities; the role of symbols as instruments of such social 
construction is consequently the crucial manipulative function of language. The mere decision 
to construct a report of legitimate replica is itself a political action regardless of the reason 
behind it.79 CRS clearly distinguishes the tactical needed measures, and the striking similarity 
between its assessment and the two OCHA situation reports poses itself a remarkable 
symbolic positioning. 
 
3.2.2 ICG 
As opposed to CRS’s report on Haiti, ICG published its “Haiti: Stabilisation and 
Reconstruction after the Quake” on the 31st March 2010, eleven weeks after the earthquake. 
The report’s disposition is as following: an executive summary and recommendations for the 
Haitian Government, its political leaders, donors, police and Security Council preludes the 
report, followed by an introduction to the unprecedented disaster and emergency response. 
Part II of the report is relevant in terms of conflict prevention and resolution as it outlines in 
detail the uncertain political landscape, socio-economic setbacks and the priorities for 
restoring security. Part III focuses on international cooperation and effective reconstruction, 
followed by a general conclusion. This episode of the essay will analyse crisis management 
and disaster preparedness in post-quake Haiti using a source focusing on conflict prevention 
and resolution. This will illustrate the corresponding rhetoric with CRS and highlight the 
success CRS had in consistently evaluating the situation in such short notice in accordance to 
Quarantelli’s and ‘t Hart’s respective theories. 
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International Crisis Group’s depiction of the situation is concise and relevant. 
The organisation introduces the natural disaster as a compounding component to a country 
with “a long history of corrupt and inefficient governments, centralised political power [and] 
extremely inequitable income distribution”.80 The characteristics of the earthquake (high 
magnitude and shallow depth) combined with Haiti’s deeply rooted social problems of 
poverty, weak institutions and an overcrowded capital produced a disaster of enormous 
scope.81 However, the government nonetheless made fuel available only days after the 
earthquake. Electricity service was restored in several areas within a month after two of the 
four electrical plants damaged were repaired (it is worth consideration that CRS identified the 
priorities of electricity generation capability82). Water supply was considered a priority by the 
Haitian government and the national water authority (DINEPA) managed to stabilise water 
supply. Sufficient cash was available just one week after the disaster struck as cooperation 
with banks was coordinated smoothly. The legislative and executive branches of government 
worked together to declare a state of emergency on the 18th January. Over 170’000 bodies 
were buried in a week to prevent spread of disease (though ICG notes the importance of 
keeping adequate burial records).83 
Tactical management measures taken by the Haitian government were thus to 
some extent (according to ICG) efficient despite the usual consensus that effective response to 
major post-disaster situations depends on strong central authority.84 The mere symbolism of 
President Préval’s characteristic silence met mass criticism from the majority of Haitians, but 
the structure of political institutions and their elaborate interactions conveyed an important 
imagery; behind the broad catchwords laid a diverse mixture of ideas and priorities that 
actually reflected crisis managerial realities in Haiti.85 The international response operation 
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saved numerous lives and averted escalation of the crisis. Haiti witnessed a quick and 
substantial emergency response from abroad, totalling $2.2 billion by the end of March.86 
Nevertheless, ICG are quick to criticise the lack of good prior disaster planning 
in a country with known seismic risks. 70% of Haiti’s national budget is funded by foreign aid 
and over 50% of its population live in abject poverty, thus making disaster monitoring and 
education a lesser priority.87 Tropical Storm Jeanne, which killed 3’000 people in 2004 and 
caused damages totalling 15% of Haiti’s GDP, compelled the authorities to give disaster 
preparedness some precedence.88 However, specific rather than generic disaster planning, and 
disaster preparedness measures too segregated rather than involving relevant social factors 
such as civic awareness education will ultimately facilitate a decisive impasse; poor planning 
can only encourage poor managerial activities.89 CRS’s report mentions the incorporation of 
disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy in order to develop its 
capacity for disaster response, mostly targeted at hurricanes.90 However, as ICG remarks, 
citizens lacked guidelines on how to react in the event of an earthquake as the improved early 
warning systems targeted hurricane awareness. This ultimately caused serious deficiencies in 
government, community and citizen preparedness and response networks.91 Disaster 
preparedness in Haiti was in fact very limited, and criticism may be directed to CRS’s 
unrealistic reliance on the incorporated development strategy.92 However, it is important to 
appreciate CRS’s rationale of recognising the principles of crisis management and disaster 
preparedness respectively as two separate entities. This trait is reflected in ICG’s criticisms to 
the situation before and after the earthquake, making CRS’s evaluation in its abrupt report 
commendable and constructively cautionary. 
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Moreover, ICG expresses disappointment with relief efforts due to the many 
clusters operating within the affected areas: “inadequate management [...] has led to an 
uneven response and undermined confidence in the UN. Relief organisations achieved better 
results in areas where there were fewer entities to coordinate”.93 In terms of crisis 
management interpretation, CRS cannot be held accountable to its appraisal for operating 
relief organisations as CRS’s report was published days after the overwhelming disaster – at 
the time of publishing there simply was a desperate need for a massive “immediate provision 
of emergency supply and personnel”.94 Quarantelli asserts that the partial to low correlation 
between disaster preparedness and crisis management resides in poor planning in the first 
place and the failure to recognise the two tools as separate entities.95 The overlapping and 
duplicating humanitarian clusters combined with the rigid UN approach for emergency 
situations highlighted by ICG ascertain criticisms directed towards relief efforts.96 CRS was 
exemplary in preliminarily assessing needed relief efforts and thus crisis managerial 
measures, even if the later reality revealed issued related to undefined police jurisdiction, 
struggling international relief coordination, and redundantly complex integration of foreign 
and domestic response efforts.97 
 
3.3 Horn of Africa 
3.3.1 OCHA 
The two situation reports below were published in two separate occasions: one during the 
epidemic stage of the drought and the other was published roughly the same time as CRS’s 
evaluation. The disposition is virtually identical to the situation reports on Haiti; the only 
difference is that each country in the Horn (Eritrea being the only exception) is fully described 
and analysed separately, with humanitarian cluster subheadings. The below passage will 
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briefly present some of the findings by OCHA’s report. It will then contrast these to CRS’s 
descriptive and analytic episodes focusing on operational challenges and the alleged 
framework for international and humanitarian response. Unlike the above presentation of 
situation reports on Haiti, the coming presentation of OCHA’s depiction of the crisis will 
interlink Situation Report #9 and #31 to illustrate identical rhetoric, and emphasise symbolic 
importance in the two considerably similar reports published by OCHA. 
 As stated above, all countries in the Horn are dealt with in detail apart from 
Eritrea. Instead of listing mere clusters for a considerably large region, the countries 
constituting the Horn of Africa are divided, with separate clusters per country. Take Djibouti 
for example - work on the Holl-Holl site, expected to ease congestion at the Ali Addeh camp 
currently hosting over 20’000 refugees, continues. Possible ground water resources are being 
explored at both sites in order to increase the quantity of safe drinking water for refugees and 
local populations surrounding the refugee camps. Djibouti’s reception of diarrhoea kits 
enables the government to sufficiently treat 200 severely dehydrated patients and over 500 
somewhat dehydrated cases. Ethiopia’s suspected case of Acute Flaccid Paralysis in the 
Somali Region has encouraged a joint investigation by the government, WHO and other NGO 
partners. The education cluster in Kenya undertook data collection exercises. It also continues 
to monitor school attendance and opening hours as security precautions for children as a result 
of fear of attacks. Logistical successes and obstacles are highlighted when OCHA encounters 
Somalia’s then current situation.98 
 These vital issues are either dealt with inadequately in CRS’s report or are not 
discussed at all. Djibouti for example is given a short historic introduction for context, with 
emphasis put on the country’s important geopolitical position.99 Over 200’000 are in need of 
assistance and 18’000 are displaced in Djibouti. Yet the country is only examined as a 
peripheral supplement to aid efforts in the other countries in the region (usually Somalia). 
Appeals for emergency efforts are presented as collective and uniform.100 From a power-
critical perspective, the political and organisational symbolism is uncanny - the general 
depiction and subsequent analytic homogeneity put forward by the Congressional Research 
Service has resulted in an inadequate assessment. There are no clusters in Djibouti as CRS 
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correctly notes – instead a humanitarian focal point was assigned by the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP).101 However, this does not relieve the severity of the humanitarian crisis 
in Djibouti, regardless of the challenges in southern Somalia and northern Kenya. The 
absence of a humanitarian cluster does not justify CRS’s ineptitude and unwillingness to 
complete the framework for international response in Djibouti. 
 With this in mind, the incongruity lies in the accentuation of the security 
impasse in the Horn. Crisis management rhetoric in CRS’s report is typified by emphasis on 
the security concern. Displacement is regarded a crucial priority, and the objective with the 
assessment is to provide a framework for humanitarian and international response. Yet CRS 
fails to depict issues of migration in constructive detail. Appeal to avoid pull factor migration 
across borders, the importance of assisting people where they live and strengthening the 
protection of vulnerable population is noted with indistinct institutional backing.102 
Homogeneity and ambiguity are fitting terms for CRS’s crisis management rhetoric as tactical 
means are merely suggested. OCHA on the other hand manages to identify responsible actors, 
their contributions and migration challenges, ranging from the Kenyan Government 
suspended registration of new arrivals in Dadaab to UNHCR’s process of establishing a 
parallel estimate of new arrivals in all sites.103 The security issue is obviously decisive for US 
humanitarian intervention. Displacement being a direct consequence of insecurity, the 
reluctance to identify significant institutional actors and taken measures to comprehend 
displacement in CRS’s report poses a frank testimony of its failed purpose of presenting a 
framework for the international and humanitarian response.  
Moreover, the analysis of operational challenges for crisis management and 
disaster preparedness in the Horn has retreated to the security impasse. The language of the 
complex set of challenges in the terms of insecurity conveys different assessment of the 
situation in terms of seriousness but foremost the allocation of responsibility for the crisis.104 
In other words, consensus is present when discussing insecurity in Somalia, as is the 
reluctance to recognise responsible institutional actors for dealing with the top priority. 
OCHA scrutinises and cooperates with relevant actors, including the Ethiopian and Kenyan 
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governments who are even suspected of deporting Somalis back.105 CRS conversely 
recognises them as mere allies, thereby successfully misconstruing the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world. 
 
3.3.2 ICG 
The chosen literature from ICG is a policy briefing focusing on what CRS regards as a core 
challenge for aid and development in the region: insecurity. “Somalia: An Opportunity that 
Should Not Be Missed” specifically analyses Somalia’s political future, while key regional 
and international players act as important peripheral supplements to the reconstruction of the 
Horn. This source was chosen because of CRS’s constant accentuation of the security 
impasse; it would be neither relevant nor constructive to utilise a general crisis perspective 
when it is evident that CRS’s report refers to security relapse. The analysis of operational 
challenges conducted in “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International 
Response” roots from the lack of security and the impossibility of maintaining diplomatic 
presence. It is unequivocal that these concerns stem from Al-Shabaab and similar militant 
insurgent elements. The policy briefing has the following disposition: a situation overview is 
followed by the renewed international attention. Focus is then put on avoiding TFG mandates, 
and challenges facing the recovered areas. Corruption and international cooperation concludes 
the briefing. In order to righteously highlight CRS’s failure to present and construct neither 
crisis managerial tactics nor long-term political strategy, the concluding episode of Part 3 will 
present ICG’s Policy Briefing on Somalia, focusing on the security concern and political 
landscape of the country’s future. The comparison will equip a justified conclusion to CRS’s 
rhetoric in its report. 
 Renewed international attention came as a result of the 2011 famine in the 
region and the subsequent necessary security awareness for providing 3.2 million people life-
saving assistance. Moreover, the military advances by AMISOM pushing Al-Shabaab on the 
defensive combined with the culminating TFG mandate further added to initiatives, including 
the UK proposal of hosting the international conference on Somalia in London on the 23rd 
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February 2012.106 Given the fact that the policy briefing was published before the London 
conference, ICG provides recommendations regarding the consensus prior to the 
congregation: no further extension of TFG, improved international cooperation, building a 
mechanism for dealing with corruption and addressing the challenges of areas recovered from 
Al-Shabaab.107 
 A fundamental problem of the TFG is the Transitional Federal Charter’s “failure 
to properly demarcate the powers of the president and the prime minister”.108 Rancorous 
power splits and the incapability of the president, prime minister and speaker to cooperate 
within parliament are to a great extent the cause behind the stagnating political progress.109 
ICG therefore promotes the promising development of the Somali National Consultative 
Constitutional Conference, which includes an “ambitious timeline to complete the final draft 
of the constitution no later than 20th April”.110 ICG mobilises regional participation and 
international cooperation; ICG even suggests, albeit carefully, negotiation with Al-Shabaab 
elements.111 CRS’s report is not intended for elaborative analysis of the political structures in 
Somalia. Some operational challenges are in fact discussed; efforts are focused on providing 
life-saving assistance to reduce mortality and prevent further displacement by assisting people 
where they live by strengthening the protection of vulnerable populations.112 However, CRS 
places insurgent elements as the core cause of instability without scrutinising the legitimacy 
of the TFG. TFG are instead victimised as targets of guerrilla-style and suicide bombings.113 
This itself is true, but lacks relevant analytical utility when discussing the protection of 
vulnerable populations. ICG on the other hand addresses clan and diaspora leaders, and the 
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need of a quasi-national governmental framework in the troubled south.114 The symbolic 
narrative of absent functioning central authority to enforce the rule of law is depicted as 
absolute by CRS, both in the terms of “managerialist” orientation and symbolic articulation of 
demands,115 thereby authenticating the security impasse status quo. 
 Disaster preparedness is defined as strategic management processes employed 
by a government to protect and prepare the people from future disasters, and ensure the 
resilience of the political structure. ICG manages to embody and include relevant actors 
needed for disaster preparedness, and identify the danger of the predatory environment that 
supervenes with power vacuums.116 CRS’s crisis management rhetoric is, as discussed above, 
restricted and cautious. What is strikingly disturbing however is its inability to assess the 
crisis from a disaster preparedness perspective neither. The “increasingly difficult security 
situation”, the complication of Islamic insurgency and the general instability in Somalia117 are 
not elaborated upon. Instead, funding is highlighted as the sole tactical measure (the US is the 
largest bilateral donor118) in alleviating poverty, and strategic processes are typified by 
military offences aimed at controlling and diverting migration to neighbouring countries.119 
An improved political structure, as ICG stress, is required to overcome the security gridlock. 
This is a bold suggestion, far too audacious to be recommended by a non-legislative US 
governmental source; it would confine Somalia’s sovereign integrity. CRS can be held 
accountable however for displacing crisis perceptions onto other domains. The security issue 
in Somalia is not perceived as a crisis itself because labels and “explanations” have been 
attached to them, portraying them as natural and inevitable.120 As mentioned above, insecurity 
is a term used extensively to describe the political climate, but the selective labelling amounts 
to a masking of the critical nature of the concern. The political landscape has been deemed 
inconceivable and politically sensitive whilst emphasis is put on successful dramaturgy, in 
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this particular case the drought.121 South-central Somalia is de facto considered a hostile 
environment at the time of publication, and militant insurgency poses a great obstacle for 
challenges of access and aid delivery to Somalia. Nevertheless conflicting, “positive” rhetoric 
in ICG’s Policy Briefing confirms the displacement of crisis perception onto a “natural” 
domain of political gridlock. Hence, from a disaster preparedness perspective, CRS has failed 
to suitably analyse operational challenges in the Horn due to its masking of an “intrinsically” 
complex crisis. 
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Part 4 
4.1 Conclusions and Reflection 
The humanitarian crises discussed above were caused by diverse incontrollable factors, and 
up-to-date results are linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions. Haiti 
experienced its history’s deadliest natural disaster recorded. It led to infrastructural 
pandemonium, loss of livelihood and bankruptcy of strategic programmes built to prepare and 
secure citizens in the face of an emergency. The immediate threat mobilised the international 
community to assist the Haitian government in the aftermath of the immense earthquake 
responsible for the death of over 100’000 people. The Horn conversely experienced a 
devastating drought further complicated by soaring food prices, massive displacement and 
political instability. Over 13 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in a 
region typified by poverty, militant insurgency and absence of democracy. The slow onset 
disaster reached its apex in the latter half of 2011 and was acknowledged as the worst 
humanitarian disaster on earth. Millions of people in both regions were affected by 
displacement, loss of livelihood and insecurity. Innumerable individuals lost their lives. 
 Congressional Research Service attempted to create a framework for the 
international and humanitarian response for the Horn and an outlined response for the 
immediate crisis that followed the earthquake in Haiti. It constructed a commendable 
evaluation for post-quake Haiti, following the model used by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The principles of crisis management and practical 
tactical measures are not presented synonymously to the principles of disaster preparedness 
and developing strategic safety net programmes. From a rhetorical crisis management 
perspective, the instantaneous differentiation is the pillar of legitimacy which CRS rests upon 
when focusing on the immediate crisis in Haiti. 
 Discrepant is the term best suited for CRS’s rhetoric when assessing its 
operational framework and analysis for the Horn. The region is politically diverse, which is 
righteously depicted. Nevertheless, operational difficulties rest upon political instability. 
Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea are discussed in little detail, and Kenya’s operational challenges 
are handled by its government, thereby relinquishing some of the responsibility from the 
international community. Somalia and migration from Somalia to neighbouring countries is 
the main premise for CRS’s assessment. This sends a clear message comprehendible from a 
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power-critical perspective. CRS has, for reasons speculated below, indeed failed to evaluate 
the humanitarian crisis in the Horn due to these evolutionary points: 1) by masking the critical 
nature of concern and naturalising the political landscape in the region (particularly Somalia), 
CRS has managed to emphasise 2) security impasse rhetoric, which ultimately resulted in 3) 
the failure to separate crisis management and disaster preparedness. 
The scope of the humanitarian crisis is indeed recognised, but overshadowed by 
CRS’s angled rhetoric: all countries in the Horn are presented, as are the successes of 
humanitarian intervention, regardless of organisation or actor. Drought in Somalia is depicted 
as a major issue domestically and regionally, leading to mass displacement, poverty and 
insecurity to the entire region. Insecurity is a term used extensively to describe the political 
climate, but the selective labelling amounts to a masking of the critical nature of the concern. 
The political landscape has been deemed inconceivable and politically sensitive whilst 
emphasis is put on successful dramaturgy, in this particular case the drought and mass 
migration.122 This has made it possible for CRS to emphasise security impasse rhetoric in 
Somalia. Such language acts as an important function to de-politicise the crisis event and 
employing a “non-partisan” channel for defining the situation and assessing failures. It is 
therefore impossible for CRS’s channel for definition to separate crisis management tactics 
and disaster preparedness strategy – there is an unconcealed reluctance to abandon security 
impasse rhetoric. Recognition of responsible actors and institutions for crisis management and 
disaster preparedness is crucial. Congressional Research Service, a respectable organ utilised 
by the US Congress for deep political analysis, has frankly chosen to omit these, resting on 
the security impasse caused by an “inherent” political landscape. 
 The emerging political context in terms of crisis management focuses on the 
decision making function, an evident trait worth further discussion. This “might easily lead 
analysts to turn a blind eye to the broader significance of crises”.123 Social, economic and 
political contextualisation is imperative to fully grasp crisis management. If one chooses 
however to go beyond the specifics of time, place, method and scale as Brändström et al 
accentuate, and look at the challenges facing communities and policy-maker, crises are left 
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without a sense of uniqueness.124 This sheds a light on the power-critical dimension to crisis 
management – the decision making function is interdependent to social, economic and 
political conditions and tensions at the face of crises. Evaluation of crisis management 
rhetoric is therefore suitably understood through the fusion of two dynamic dimensions: 1) 
contextualisation of the definer of the crises, introducing a broader power-critical approach 
and 2) appositely rigid differentiation of crisis management and disaster preparedness. 
By scrutinising CRS’s reports with a power-critical approach, CRS’s 
disinclining rhetoric in its Horn Report has become evident – it is impossible to conduct fair 
evaluations of crises without applying rigid differentiation. Another problem which deserves 
further discussion lies within the realm of power criticism. Crisis management literature is 
aimed at policy-makers, organisations and states. Narrative frequently targets accomplishment 
and failures in the face of crises and scholars agree that communication is central. These 
findings mean little however if entities such as CRS and other analytical bodies assessing 
crises are politically biased and unwilling to employ more flexible power-critical approach. 
Focus on relief factors instead of crisis management measures in Somalia due to diplomatic 
strains highlights the realistic and dangerous capacity of crisis management rhetoric. OCHA 
and ICG constructed applausive literature aimed for the wellbeing of peoples in both 
discussed regions. Political discourse could have immense effect on the outcome surrounding 
crises. To what extent CRS has contributed or thwarted crisis management rhetoric can only 
be speculated upon. Judging from two of its crisis assessments, one can only anticipate 
uncertainty in the next coming catastrophe. 
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